Tuesday 24 November 2015

YOU HAVE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT IF POLICE ARREST YOU



Credit - www.patrol-log.com
I have seen a number of Hollywood movies where upon arrest by the police, the suspect is read his rights. This means the suspect has been mirandized. This experience is however different from  Nollywood movies, where upon arrest, a suspect is told that he would be informed of the reason for his arrest when he gets to the police station. If this is actually the reality in Nigeria, then I must say the Nigerian police force is doing something wrong.

Saturday 15 August 2015

In most claims that arise from accidents or injuries -- from car accidents to "slip and fall" cases -- the basis for holding a person or company legally responsible for any resulting harm comes from a theory called "negligence."
Generally speaking, when someone acts in a careless way and causes an injury to another person, under the legal principle of "negligence" the careless person will be legally liable for any resulting harm. This basis for assessing and determining fault is utilized in most disputes involving an accident or injury, during informal settlement talks and up through a trial in a personal injury lawsuit.
Elements of a Negligence Claim
In order to win a negligence case, the plaintiff (the person injured) must prove the following four elements to show that the defendant (the person allegedly at fault) acted negligently:
  1. Duty - The defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff under the circumstances;
  2. Breach  - The defendant breached that legal duty by acting or failing to act in a certain way;
  3. Causation  - It was the defendant's actions (or inaction) that actually caused the plaintiff's injury; and
  4. Damages - The plaintiff was harmed or injured as a result of the defendant's actions.
Element #1: Duty
When assessing a negligence claim, the first step is to look to see whether or not the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty of care. In some circumstances, the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant might create a legal duty -- for instance, a doctor owes a patient a legal duty to provide him or her with competent medical care. Or, the defendant may owe the plaintiff a legal duty to act with reasonable care in a certain situation -- as is the case when one is expected to operate a motor vehicle safely and with a certain level of due care.
Element #2: Breach of Duty
Next, the court will look to see whether the defendant breached this duty by doing (or not doing something) that a "reasonably prudent person" would do under similar circumstances. The term "reasonably prudent person" refers to a legal standard that represents how the average person would responsibly act in a certain situation. Stated simply, the defendant likely will be found negligent if the average person, knowing what the defendant knew at the time, would have known that someone might have been injured as a result of his or her actions -- and would have acted differently than the defendant did in that situation.
Element #3: Causation
The third element requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant's negligence actually caused his or her injury. Sure, someone might be acting negligently, but the plaintiff can only recover if this negligence somehow causes the injury. For example, it wouldn't be fair to sue someone who was negligently texting and driving for a totally unrelated fender bender that happened just across the street -- just because the driver was negligent.
Another aspect of this element looks at whether the defendant could reasonably have foreseen that his or her actions might cause an injury. If the defendant's actions somehow caused the plaintiff injury through a random, unexpected act of nature, the injury would most likely be deemed unforeseeable -- and the defendant will not likely be found liable.
Element #4: Damages
The final element of a negligence case is damages. This element requires that the court be able to compensate the plaintiff for his or her injury -- usually through monetary compensation for expenses such as medical care or property repair.
- See more at: http://injury.findlaw.com/accident-injury-law/proving-fault-what-is-negligence.html#sthash.clmnjAsW.dpuf
In most claims that arise from accidents or injuries -- from car accidents to "slip and fall" cases -- the basis for holding a person or company legally responsible for any resulting harm comes from a theory called "negligence."
Generally speaking, when someone acts in a careless way and causes an injury to another person, under the legal principle of "negligence" the careless person will be legally liable for any resulting harm. This basis for assessing and determining fault is utilized in most disputes involving an accident or injury, during informal settlement talks and up through a trial in a personal injury lawsuit.
Elements of a Negligence Claim
In order to win a negligence case, the plaintiff (the person injured) must prove the following four elements to show that the defendant (the person allegedly at fault) acted negligently:
  1. Duty - The defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff under the circumstances;
  2. Breach  - The defendant breached that legal duty by acting or failing to act in a certain way;
  3. Causation  - It was the defendant's actions (or inaction) that actually caused the plaintiff's injury; and
  4. Damages - The plaintiff was harmed or injured as a result of the defendant's actions.
Element #1: Duty
When assessing a negligence claim, the first step is to look to see whether or not the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty of care. In some circumstances, the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant might create a legal duty -- for instance, a doctor owes a patient a legal duty to provide him or her with competent medical care. Or, the defendant may owe the plaintiff a legal duty to act with reasonable care in a certain situation -- as is the case when one is expected to operate a motor vehicle safely and with a certain level of due care.
Element #2: Breach of Duty
Next, the court will look to see whether the defendant breached this duty by doing (or not doing something) that a "reasonably prudent person" would do under similar circumstances. The term "reasonably prudent person" refers to a legal standard that represents how the average person would responsibly act in a certain situation. Stated simply, the defendant likely will be found negligent if the average person, knowing what the defendant knew at the time, would have known that someone might have been injured as a result of his or her actions -- and would have acted differently than the defendant did in that situation.
Element #3: Causation
The third element requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant's negligence actually caused his or her injury. Sure, someone might be acting negligently, but the plaintiff can only recover if this negligence somehow causes the injury. For example, it wouldn't be fair to sue someone who was negligently texting and driving for a totally unrelated fender bender that happened just across the street -- just because the driver was negligent.
Another aspect of this element looks at whether the defendant could reasonably have foreseen that his or her actions might cause an injury. If the defendant's actions somehow caused the plaintiff injury through a random, unexpected act of nature, the injury would most likely be deemed unforeseeable -- and the defendant will not likely be found liable.
Element #4: Damages
The final element of a negligence case is damages. This element requires that the court be able to compensate the plaintiff for his or her injury -- usually through monetary compensation for expenses such as medical care or property repair.
- See more at: http://injury.findlaw.com/accident-injury-law/proving-fault-what-is-negligence.html#sthash.clmnjAsW.dpuf
In most claims that arise from accidents or injuries -- from car accidents to "slip and fall" cases -- the basis for holding a person or company legally responsible for any resulting harm comes from a theory called "negligence."
Generally speaking, when someone acts in a careless way and causes an injury to another person, under the legal principle of "negligence" the careless person will be legally liable for any resulting harm. This basis for assessing and determining fault is utilized in most disputes involving an accident or injury, during informal settlement talks and up through a trial in a personal injury lawsuit.
Elements of a Negligence Claim
In order to win a negligence case, the plaintiff (the person injured) must prove the following four elements to show that the defendant (the person allegedly at fault) acted negligently:
  1. Duty - The defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff under the circumstances;
  2. Breach  - The defendant breached that legal duty by acting or failing to act in a certain way;
  3. Causation  - It was the defendant's actions (or inaction) that actually caused the plaintiff's injury; and
  4. Damages - The plaintiff was harmed or injured as a result of the defendant's actions.
Element #1: Duty
When assessing a negligence claim, the first step is to look to see whether or not the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty of care. In some circumstances, the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant might create a legal duty -- for instance, a doctor owes a patient a legal duty to provide him or her with competent medical care. Or, the defendant may owe the plaintiff a legal duty to act with reasonable care in a certain situation -- as is the case when one is expected to operate a motor vehicle safely and with a certain level of due care.
Element #2: Breach of Duty
Next, the court will look to see whether the defendant breached this duty by doing (or not doing something) that a "reasonably prudent person" would do under similar circumstances. The term "reasonably prudent person" refers to a legal standard that represents how the average person would responsibly act in a certain situation. Stated simply, the defendant likely will be found negligent if the average person, knowing what the defendant knew at the time, would have known that someone might have been injured as a result of his or her actions -- and would have acted differently than the defendant did in that situation.
Element #3: Causation
The third element requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant's negligence actually caused his or her injury. Sure, someone might be acting negligently, but the plaintiff can only recover if this negligence somehow causes the injury. For example, it wouldn't be fair to sue someone who was negligently texting and driving for a totally unrelated fender bender that happened just across the street -- just because the driver was negligent.
Another aspect of this element looks at whether the defendant could reasonably have foreseen that his or her actions might cause an injury. If the defendant's actions somehow caused the plaintiff injury through a random, unexpected act of nature, the injury would most likely be deemed unforeseeable -- and the defendant will not likely be found liable.
Element #4: Damages
The final element of a negligence case is damages. This element requires that the court be able to compensate the plaintiff for his or her injury -- usually through monetary compensation for expenses such as medical care or property repair.
- See more at: http://injury.findlaw.com/accident-injury-law/proving-fault-what-is-negligence.html#sthash.clmnjAsW.dpuf

Saturday 18 July 2015

PROVISIONS OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST PERSONS ACT 2015 (PART 1)

PROVISIONS OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST PERSONS ACT 2015 (PART 1) The Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Act 2015 recently signed into law is an act to eliminate violence in private and public life, prohibit all forms of violence against persons and to provide maximum protection and effective remedies for victims and punishment of offenders in Abuja. The law begins in Section 1 by defining rape as the intentional penetration of the vagina, anus or mouth of another person if such person does not consent to the said penetration or if the consent is obtained by force or means of threat or intimidation. It also recognises that women can commit rape as well. Section 2 states that a person if found guilty of rape will be liable to imprisonment for life except where the offender is less than 14 years in which such person will be liable to a maximum of 12 years in prison, however, in other cases such person can only be sentenced to a minimum of 12 years in prison. If the rape is however committed by a group of persons, the offenders are liable jointly to a maximum of 20 years imprisonment without option of fine and the court shall also award compensation to the victim.

Friday 8 May 2015


Negligence

Most injuries that result from tortious behavior are the product of negligence,
not intentional wrongdoing. Negligence is the term used by tort law to
characterize behavior that creates unreasonable risks of harm to persons and
property. A person acts negligently when his behavior departs from the conduct
ordinarily expected of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. In
general, the law requires jurors to use their common sense and life experience
in determining the proper degree of care and vigilance with which people must
lead their lives to avoid imperiling the safety of others.
Not every accident producing injury gives rise to liability for negligence. Some
accidents cannot be avoided even with the exercise of reasonable care. An
accident that results from a defendant's sudden and unexpected physical
ailment, such as a seizure or a blackout, generally relieves the defendant of
liability for harm caused during his period of unconsciousness. However,
defendants who have reason to know of such medical problems are expected to
take reasonable precautions against the risks the problems create. In some
jurisdictions unavoidable accidents are called ACTS OF GOD.
Assumption of Risk is another defense to negligence actions. This defense
prevents plaintiffs from recovering for injuries sustained as a result of a
relationship or transaction they entered with full knowledge and acceptance of
the risks commonly associated with such undertakings. Assumed risks include
most of those encountered by spectators attending sporting events. However,
the law will not assume that individuals accept the risk of intentionally inflicted
harm or damage, such as injuries resulting from Assault and Battery.
Strict Liability
In some cases tort law imposes liability on defendants who are neither
negligent nor guilty of intentional wrongdoing. Known as Strict Liability , or
liability without fault, this branch of torts seeks to regulate those activities that
are useful and necessary but that create abnormally dangerous risks to society.
These activities include blasting, transporting hazardous materials, storing
dangerous substances, and keeping certain wild animals in captivity.
A distinction is sometimes drawn between moral fault and legal fault. Persons
who negligently or intentionally cause injury to others are often considered
morally blameworthy for having failed to live up to a minimal threshold of
human conduct. On the other hand, legal fault is more of an artificial standard
of conduct that is created by government for the protection of society.
Persons who engage in ultrahazardous activities may be morally blameless
because no amount of care or diligence can make their activities safe for
society. However, such persons will nonetheless be held legally responsible for
harm that results from their activities as a means of shifting the costs of injury
from potential victims to tortfeasors. As a matter of social policy, then,
individuals and entities that engage in abnormally dangerous activities for profit
must be willing to ensure the safety of others as a price of doing business.
Consumers who have been injured by defectively manufactured products also
rely on strict liability. Under the doctrine of strict Product Liability , a
manufacturer must guarantee that its goods are suitable for their intended use
when they are placed on the market for public consumption. The law of torts
will hold manufacturers strictly liable for any injuries that result from placing
unreasonably dangerous products into the stream of commerce, without regard
to the amount of care exercised in preparing the product for sale and
distribution and without regard to whether the consumer purchased the product
from, or entered into a contractual relationship with, the manufacturer.
Causation
Causation is an element common to all three branches of torts: strict liability,
negligence, and intentional wrongs. Causation has two prongs. First, a tort must
be the cause in fact of a particular injury, which means that a specific act must
actually have resulted in injury to another. In its simplest form, cause in fact is
established by evidence that shows that a tortfeasor's act or omission was a
necessary antecedent to the plaintiff's injury. Courts analyze this issue by
determining whether the plaintiff's injury would have occurred "but for" the
defendant's conduct. If an injury would have occurred independent of the
defendant's conduct, cause in fact has not been established, and no tort has
been committed. When multiple factors have led to a particular injury, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the tortfeasor's action played a substantial role
in causing the injury.
Second, plaintiffs must establish that a particular tort was the proximate cause
of an injury before liability will be imposed. The term proximate cause is
somewhat misleading because it has little to do with proximity or causation.
Proximate cause limits the scope of liability to those injuries that bear some
reasonable relationship to the risk created by the defendant. Proximate cause is
evaluated in terms of foresee-ability. If the defendant should have foreseen the
tortious injury, he or she will be held liable for the resulting loss. If a given risk
could not have been reasonably anticipated, proximate cause has not been
established, and liability will not be imposed.
When duty, breach, and proximate cause have been established in a tort action,
the plaintiff may recover damages for the pecuniary losses sustained. The
measure of damages is determined by the nature of the tort committed and the
type of injury suffered. Damages for tortious acts generally fall into one of four
categories: damages for injury to person, damages for injury to Personal
Property , damages for injury to real property, and Punitive Damages.
Damages
Personal injury tort victims must normally recover all their damages—past,
present, and future—during a single lawsuit. Damages may be recovered for
physical, psychological, and emotional injury. Specifically, these injuries may
include permanent disability, pain and suffering, disfigurement, humiliation,
embarrassment, distress, impairment of earning capacity, lost wages or profits,
medical costs, and out-of-pocket expenses. Courts typically rely on Expert
Testimony to translate such losses into dollar figures.
Plaintiffs suffering damage to personal property must elect between two
methods of recovery. First, plaintiffs may elect to recover the difference
between the value of the property before the tort and the value of the property
after it. Second, plaintiffs may elect to recover the reasonable costs of repair
for damaged personal property. However, if the property is destroyed,
irreparable, or economically infeasible to repair, damages are measured by the
replacement value of the property. Persons who are temporarily deprived of
personalty may sue to recover the rental value of the property for the period of
deprivation.
Damages for injury to real property may be measured by the difference in the
realty's value before and after the tort. Alternatively, plaintiffs may elect to
recover the reasonable costs of restoring the property to its original condition.
In either case plaintiffs may also recover the rental value of their property if its
use and enjoyment has been interrupted by tortious behavior. Mental,
emotional, and physical harm that is sustained in the process of a tortious
injury to real property is compensable as well.
Punitive damages, called exemplary damages in some jurisdictions, are
recoverable against tortfeasors whose injurious conduct is sufficiently
egregious. Although punitive damages are typically awarded for injuries
suffered from intentional torts, they can also be awarded against tortfeasors
who act with reckless indifference to the safety of others. Because one purpose
of punitive damages is to punish the defendant, plaintiffs may introduce
evidence regarding a tortfeasor's wealth to allow the jury to better assess the
amount of damages necessary for punishment. Such evidence is normally
deemed irrelevant or prejudicial in almost every other type of damage claim.
In addition to damages for past tortious conduct, plaintiffs may seek injunctive
relief to prevent future harm. Manufacturing plants that billow smoke that
pollutes the air, companies that discharge chemicals that poison the water, and
factories that store chemicals that migrate through the soil create risks of injury
that are likely to recur over time. In tort law, operations that produce recurring
injuries like these are called nuisances. If the harmfulness of such operations
outweighs their usefulness, plaintiffs may successfully obtain a court order
enjoining or restraining them.
Immunity
Certain individuals and entities are granted Immunity from both damage awards
and assessments of liability in tort. An immunity is a defense to a legal action
where public policy demands special protection for an entity or a class of
persons participating in a particular field or activity. Historically, immunity from
tort litigation has been granted to government units, public officials, charities,
educational institutions, spouses, parents, and children.
Government immunity, also known as Sovereign Immunity , insulates federal,
state, and local governments from liability for torts that an employee commits
within the scope of his or her official duties. Public policy, as reflected by
legislation, common-law precedent, and popular opinion, has required courts to
protect the government from unnecessary disruptions that invariably result from
civil litigation. Similarly, educational institutions generally have been immunized
from tort actions to protect students and faculty from distraction.In a number of
states, tortfeasors have been given immunity from liability if they are related to
the victim as husband or wife, or parent or child. These states concluded that
family harmony should not be traumatized by the adversarial nature of tort
litigation. Charities and other philanthropic organizations have been given
qualified immunity from tort liability as well. This immunity is based on the fear
that donors would stop giving money to charities if the funds were used to pay
tort claims.
Over the last quarter century, nearly every jurisdiction has curtailed tort
immunity in some fashion. Several jurisdictions have abolished tort immunity
for entire groups and entities. The movement to restrict tort immunity has been
based in part on the Rule of Law , which requires all persons, organizations, and
government officials to be treated equally under the law. Despite the efforts of
this movement, tort immunity persists in various forms at the federal, state, and
local levels.

LAW OF TORT

A body of rights, obligations, and remedies that is applied by courts in civil
proceedings to provide relief for persons who have suffered harm from the wrongful
acts of others. The person who sustains injury or suffers pecuniary damage as the
result of tortious conduct is known as the plaintiff, and the person who is responsible
for inflicting the injury and incurs liability for the damage is known as the defendant or
tortfeasor.
Three elements must be established in every tort action. First, the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant was under a legal duty to act in a particular
fashion. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant breached
this duty by failing to conform his or her behavior accordingly. Third, the
plaintiff must prove that he suffered injury or loss as a direct result of the
defendant's breach.
The law of torts is derived from a combination of common-law principles and
legislative enactments. Unlike actions for breach of contract, tort actions are
not dependent upon an agreement between the parties to a lawsuit. Unlike
criminal prosecutions, which are brought by the government, tort actions are
brought by private citizens. Remedies for tortious acts include money damages
and injunctions (court orders compelling or forbidding particular conduct).
Tortfeasors are subject to neither fine nor incarceration in civil court.
The word tort comes from the Latin term torquere, which means "twisted or
wrong." The English Common Law recognized no separate legal action in tort.
Instead, the British legal system afforded litigants two central avenues of
redress: Trespass for direct injuries, and actions "on the case" for indirect
injuries. Gradually, the common law recognized other civil actions, including
Defamation , LIBEL, and slander. Most of the American colonies adopted the
English common law in the eighteenth century. During the nineteenth century,
the first U.S. legal treatises were published in which a portion of the common
law was synthesized under the heading of torts.
Over the last century, tort law has touched on nearly every aspect of life in the
United States. In economic affairs, tort law provides remedies for businesses
that are harmed by the unfair and deceptive trade practices of a competitor. In
the workplace, tort law protects employees from the intentional or negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Tort law also helps regulate the environment,
providing remedies against both individuals and businesses that pollute the air,
land, and water to such an extent that it amounts to a Nuisance.
Sometimes tort law governs life's most intimate relations, as when individuals
are held liable for knowingly transmitting communicable diseases to their sexual
partners. When a loved one is killed by a tortious act, surviving family members
may bring a Wrongful Death action to recover pecuniary loss. Tort law also
governs a wide array of behavior in less intimate settings, including the
operation of motor vehicles on public roadways.
The law of torts serves four objectives. First, it seeks to compensate victims for
injuries suffered by the culpable action or inaction of others. Second, it seeks
to shift the cost of such injuries to the person or persons who are legally
responsible for inflicting them. Third, it seeks to discourage injurious, careless,
and risky behavior in the future. Fourth, it seeks to vindicate legal rights and
interests that have been compromised, diminished, or emasculated. In theory
these objectives are served when tort liability is imposed on tortfeasors for
intentional wrongdoing, Negligence, and ultrahazardous activities.
Intentional Torts
An intentional tort is any deliberate interference with a legally recognized
interest, such as the rights to bodily integrity, emotional tranquility, dominion
over property, seclusion from public scrutiny, and freedom from confinement or
deception. These interests are violated by the intentional torts of assault,
Battery, trespass, False Imprisonment , invasion of privacy, conversion,
Misrepresentation , and Fraud. The intent element of these torts is satisfied
when the tortfeasor acts with the desire to bring about harmful consequences
and is substantially certain that such consequences will follow. Mere reckless
behavior, sometimes called willful and wanton behavior, does not rise to the
level of an intentional tort.
Under certain circumstances the law permits individuals to intentionally pursue
a course of conduct that will necessarily result in harm to others. The harm that
results from such conduct is said to be outweighed by more important
interests. Self-preservation is one such interest and is embodied in the right of
Self-Defense . Individuals may exert sufficient force in self-defense.

Thursday 7 May 2015

Supreme Court bars NASS from amending constitution 

 The Supreme Court on Thursday ordered the

Federal Government and the National Assembly to
maintain status quo in the suit filed by the Attorney-
General of the Federation over constitutional amendments.
President Jonathan had withheld his assent to the
amendments to some sections of the 1999 Constitution
and instituted a suit against NASS at the Supreme Court to
annul the amendments.
At the apex court’s sitting presided over by the Chief
Justice of Nigeria (CJN), Justice Mahmud Mohammed, the
parties were ordered to maintain status quo till the hearing
of the suit on June 18.
This, the court said, was to give the counsel to the
Federal Government, Mr Bayo Ojo (SAN) adequate time to
prepare to address the court on salient constitutional
issues raised in his originating processes.
The CJN also ordered that hearing notice be issued and
served on the NASS (respondent), which was not
represented in court, to enable it to appear before the
court on the adjourned date.
Earlier, Ojo told the court that the subject-matter of the
suit was the President’s grouse against the procedure
employed by NASS in the amendment to the Fourth
Schedule of the Constitution.
The President’s counsel said that NASS ought to have
complied with Section 8 and Section 9 of the constitution
in carrying out the amendment, which necessitated the
President withdrawing his assent.
Jonathan had in a seven-page letter to the Senate
President, David Mark, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Aminu Tambuwal, queried NASS’
decision to whittle down some executive powers of
Nigeria’s president.
The President had faulted some aspects of the
amendments which give executive powers and duties to
the legislature and the judiciary, being reasons for his
refusal to sign the document into law.
"In view of the foregoing and absence of credible
evidence that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria (Fourth Alteration) Act 2015 satisfied the strict
requirements of Section 9(3) of the 1999 Constitution, it
will be unconstitutional for me to assent to it,” the
president said.
Ojo, in the suit filed on behalf of the President and
Attorney-General of the Federation, however, argued that
the amendment passed by NASS did not have the
mandatory requirement of four-fifth majority of NASS.
Also read: FG drags national assembly to court over
amended constitution
The government also requested the Supreme Court to give
an order nullifying and setting aside Sections 3, 4, 12, 14,
21, 23, 36, 39, 40, 43 and 44 of the Fourth Alteration Act,
2015 purportedly passed by the legislature.
Ojo argued that the defendant was making moves, with
the tacit consent of state legislators, to employ certain
provisions of the Constitution to pass the purported
Fourth Alteration Act, 2015 into Law.
According to the plaintiff’s counsel, the Fourth Alteration
Act 2015 contains many proposed amendments
inconsistent with the spirit of federalism, separation of
powers, checks and balances.
He argued that it would be in the interest of justice to
grant all prayers sought because most of the provisions
of the purported Fourth Alteration Act 2015 are contrary to
public policy and good governance.
The National Assembly had before the filing of the suit by
the Federal Government and Thursday’s order for the
maintenance of status quo, said after 30 days, it would
override the veto of the president.
- NAN

 FOR THOSE OF US TAKING COMPANY LAW
COMPANY LAW
: History of company law in NigeriaIn 1876, the supreme court ordinance was promulgated
in Lagos which was ceded to the British colony in 1861.
Under the ordinance, Tue common law of England, the
doctrines of equity and the statutes of general
application which were in force in England on the 24th
day of July 1874, were to be in force within tue court's
jurisdiction.
7 / 11
After the proclamation of the protectorate of northern
and Southern Nigeria in 1900, the supreme court
proclamation of 1900 of Southern Nigeria and tue
supreme court proclamation, 1902 of Northern Nigeria,
were introduced. With each proclamation, making the
common law of England, the doctrines of equity and the
statutes of general application in force in England on the
1st day of January 1900 applicable in Nigeria.
In 1914, the two protectorates were amalgamated and
the supreme court ordinance of 1914 was promulgated to
cover the whole country. The ordinance also provided
for the applicability of tue common law of England, the
doctrine of equity and S.O.G.A.
The first local company law in Nigeria was promulgated
in 1912, that was the companies ordinance of 1912,
which was based on the English companies act of 1908.
It was originally applied to the colony of Lagos but
later, in 1917, applied to the rest of the country. In 1922,
the previous ordinances was consolidated and later
repealed and replaced with the companies ordinance of
1922. The 1922 ordinance was subsequentlyamended in
1929,1941, and 1954. And became part of LFN 1948
edition. And later 1958.
In 1958, the companies act under..... The 1968 act was a
marked improvement on the previous laws. It made
mandatory provisions for accounts and encouraged
greater accountability of directors. Similarly it required
foreign companies intending to carry on business in
Nigeria to be locally incorporated. However, despite
these improvements, there were still several criticisms
that the improvements did not adequately deal with the
rapid economic and commercial growth if the country
especially the sudden boom of petroleum oil wealth
between 1970 and 1979.
It is in this regard that in 1987, the Nigerian law reform
commission was directed by the then attorney general of
the federation to undertake a review and reform of
Nigerian company law. This led to the draft decree
which was promulgated into the companies and allied
matters decree 1 of 1990.
The decree was amended as the companies and allied
matters amendment decree no 32 of 1990, decree no 46
of 1991 and no 40of 1992. In 1999, part 17, that is,
dealings in companies securities was transferred to the
investment and securities act no 45, 1999. The current
companies statute can now be found in chapter C20
L.F.N. 2004. Part A of the act deals with incorporated
companies, B with registration of business names. C
with incorporated trustees, pt D deals with citations.
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE ACT
1. Inclusion and modification of some relevant common
law principles, e.g the doctrine of ultra vires, issues of
promoters.....,The principle of legal personality
8 / 11
2. Introduction of Corporate affairs commission
3. Introduction of minimum share capital.
4. Stronger control over directors and accounts.
5. Provisions for the appointments, qualifications, duties
and tenure for the office of the company secretary.
6. Provisions relating to majority rules and minority
protection.
CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION.
The C.A.C is a body corporate with perpetual succession
and a common seal. It is capable of suing and being
sued in its corporate name. It is also capable of
acquiring, holding or disposing of any property movable
or immovable for the purpose of carrying out it's
functions. S 1 CAMA. Tue headquarters of rye
commission is located in Abuja with branches to be
established in each state. So far, branches have been
establishes in virtually all states
FUNCTIONS
1. Administration of the act including the regulation and
supervision, registration and winding up of companies.
2. Establishment and maintenance of companies registry
and offices in all the states in a federation.
3. Conduct of investigation into the affairs of any
company where the interest if tue shareholders and
public so demands.
4. Administration of business names and incorporation
of trustees pact of the act.
5. Such other activities as are necessary for giving effect
to the act's provision. S 7 C.A.M.A.
The chief executive of the commission is a registrar
general who must be a legal practitioner and has been
so qualified for not less than ten years. Who must have
an experience in the practice and administration in
company law for not less than 8 years.
ACCREDITATION
Legal practitioners, chattered accountants and chattered
secretaries are the only professionals authorized to
transact business with C.A.C in respect of corporate
matters in Part A of the act. However, these
professionals must be formally accredited with the
commission.
9 / 11
PROCEDURE FOR ACCREDITATION
1. Obtain and complete accreditation form at C.A.C
2. Return of the completed application form to be
accompanied by:
• Two passport photographs
• Copy of qualifying certificate
• Practising fee receipt for the year of application.
• N.Y.S.C discharge or exception certificate.
• Accreditation fee of 2,500 for individuals and 5,000 for
firms.
Week 2: Types and classification of company.
A company, according to the Black's law dictionary, is a
union or association of persons for carrying on a
commercial or industrial enterprise ; a partnership,
corporation, association, joint stock company.
TYPES OF COMPANY
There are two types of company under the CAMA. They
are:
1. Private company
2. Public company
1. Private company: According to section 22(1) CAMA, a
private company is one which states so in its
memorandum of association. It has the following
features :
• It restricts the transfer of its shares. S 22(2) CAMA
• It has not more than fifty members. S 22(3).
• If two people jointly purchase shares they shall be
regarded as one pursuant to S 22(3) CAMA - S 22(4)
According to S 5 CAMA, a private company shall not
unless authorized by law, invite the public to:
• Subscribe to shares or debentures in the company
• Make deposit for a fixed period even if for interest.
2. Public company: A public company according to S 24
CAMA is any company that is not private and it shall be
stated in its memorandum.
FEATURES OF A COMPANY.
A company may either be limited liability or unlimited
liability.
1. Limited liability: This is divided into:
• Company limited by shares: According to S 21(1)a, a
company limited by shares is one in which liability of
members is restricted to the amount of shares purchased
in the company.
• Company limited by guarantee: According to S 21(1)b
CAMA, a company limited by guarantee is one in which
liability of members is restricted to the amount they
contributed towards the shares of the company.
Companies limited by guarantee are not for making
profit. S 26(1) CAMA
2. Unlimited company: This is a company in which the
liability of members in case of liquidation is unlimited.
If the company liquidated, members have to pay for the
debt of the company.
CAPACITY OF INDIVIDUAL TO FORM COMPANY.
According to S 20(1) CAMA, The following people cannot
form a company:
1. Someone under 18 years.
2. Someone dat has been proven by a court or elsewhere
to be of unsound mind.
3. Someone dat is an undischarged bankrupt.
4. A person disqualified from being a director under S
254 CAMA.
Section 20(2) CAMA provides that if any two people who
are not disqualified in S 1(a) sign the memorandum, it is
valid and a company could be formed. That Is if the
other two are more than 18 and above. It stands.
A corporate body in liquidation can't form a company S
20(3) CAMA.
S 20(4) CAMA says that subject to any laws restricting
it, an alien or foreign corporation may join in the
formation of Company.
INCORPORATION OF A COMPANY
S 18 CAMA states that any two or more persons that are
qualified can form a company. S 19(1) CAMA says that
no company, association or partnership consisting of
more than 20 persons can be formed without
subscribing to the act. According to S 19(2) CAMA, those
excluded from this are co-operative societies and
partnerships of lawyers or accountants.
According to S 35(2) CAMA, in order to incorporate a
company, the following must be provided to the
commission:
• Memorandums of Association and Article of association
• The address of the company and the head-office if
required. A P.O. Box shall not be accepted as an
address.
• A document containing the list, particulars and consent
of the first directors of the company.
• A statement of authorized share capital signed by at
least one director
• Any other document required by the commission to
satisfy the requirement of any law relating to the
formation of a company.
• S 35(3) CAMA, A statement of declaration by a legal
practitioner that the requirement of the act have been
complied with shall be produced to the commission. If
the commission rejects the declaration, it shall notify the
declarant within 30 days.

Saturday 2 May 2015



AKINBOLADE DELE V. THE STATE

THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NIGERIA
ON FRIDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2015
CA/AK/128C/2013;
LN-e-LR/2015/1 (CA)


BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS

MOJEED ADEKUNLE                                        JUSTICE COURT OF APPEAL

MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA                     JUSTICE COURT OF APPEAL

JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI                                   JUSTICE COURT OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES

Isiaka Abiola Olagunju Esq. For Appellant

AND

A. O. Adeyemi - Tuki D.P.P. Ministry Of Justice, Ondo State For Respondent


CONNECTED AREA(S) OF PRACTICE

1. Criminal Law

2. Litigation - Death Row and Appellate Proceedings

3. Constitutional Law


ORIGINATING STATE

Ondo State: High Court

MAIN ISSUES
1.     EVIDENCE - CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: Securing conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence  
2.   CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – EVBIDENCE - CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT OF AN ACCUSED PERSON: Whether the confessional statement of an accused person can solely provide the basis for his conviction
3.    CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – EVIDENCE - PROOF OF ARMED ROBBERY: What needs to be proved to secure a conviction for armed robbery
4.     CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – FAIR HEARING - RIGHT TO AN INTERPRETER: Rules guiding the requirement of the law that an accused person receive adequate interpretation of trial proceedings  conducted in a language he does not understand
5.     CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE - STANDARD OF PROOF: Standard of proof in a criminal trial
6.   CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE - STATEMENT OF A CO-ACCUSED: The effect of a using the statement of an accused person against a co-accused suspect


-----------------------------------
MAIN JUDGMENT

JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI, J.C.A.(Delivering The Leading Judgment):

This appeal is against the judgment of the Ondo State High Court sitting at Ondo delivered on the 15th May, 2012. The Appellant and three others were charged with robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery contrary to section 1(2)(a) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act Cap 11 R 11 Vol. 14 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 and Section 5(b) of the Same Law.

The case of the Respondent as can be gathered from the evidence of six witnesses who testified for the prosecution is quite simple. According to Yaya Suberu (PW1), at about 2:00am on the 6th January, 2005 he heard the voice of one of his boys who slept in the passage that leads to his room.

When he asked who was in the house at that hour somebody responded by saying that the boy should keep quiet otherwise he would shoot.

While the Pw1 was walking with his torchlight in hand towards the boy, he saw somebody in the passage run down the stair-case. Pw1 shouted "thief, thief" and two other people opened the door to the house. All the three people wore masks. They asked for money. They ransacked the whole house looking for money. They took all the money in the house. They took two handsets and jewelleries.

Apart from the guns they carried, the people had an axe, knife and a torchlight.

In the morning the Pw1 reported to the police but that because the three people wore masked he could not identify any of them. He also did not suspect anyone.

On 13th January, 2005 based on information received, the Appellant and the others were arrested.

When Pw1 went to the police station, he saw the Appellant with his wife's jewelleries that were stolen.

The Appellant in two statements he had made to the police (Exhibits H and H1) talked of different operations carried out by them. But in his defence in court, the Appellant denied committing the offence. He once worked for the Pw1 he said but could not continue due to ill-health. Nothing belonging to the Pw1, he said was recovered from him.

After hearing the evidence led by the Respondent, one of the accused persons was discharged on a no case submission. The Appellant and two others were convicted and sentenced to death for armed robbery after a full blown trial. It is the conviction and sentence to death that have led the Appellant here. He filed a Notice of Appeal on 14th June, 2012 containing one Ground of Appeal. Pursuant to an order of this court made on 19th March, 2014, the Appellant filed an amended Notice of Appeal containing four grounds of appeal from which he presented the following issues for determination:

1)     Having regards to the circumstances of this case, whether or not the procedure adopted by the Lower Court has not breached the Appellant's right to fair hearing, (Ground 1 and 2)

2)      Whether or not the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant to warrant the conviction.

The Respondent adopted the two issues formulated by the Appellant.

On issue 1, it was contended that the record of appeal page 75 shows that the Appellant opted to be tried in Yoruba language. That the Appellant's plea was taken in Yoruba language and he also gave his evidence in Yoruba language. That the Pw2 - Pw6 gave their evidence in English language inspite of the fact that the Appellant does not understand English language and no provision was made for an interpreter. This it was submitted was a violation of the Appellant's right to an interpreter. We were referred to Section 36 (6)(e) of the 1999 Constitution FRN (as amended) and Madu v State (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt 482) 386 at 408 D.

It was submitted that the Appellant's Constitutional right to an interpreter is a right which is sacrosanct and cannot be waived by counsel.

It was submitted that should the court find that the constitutional right of the Appellant was not breached the court should find that the Appellant denied making the extra judicial statement and not that it was involuntarily made. Therefore the trial within trial was inappropriate.

It was further submitted that the statements of the Appellant Exhibits H and H1 were not subjected to any statutory tests before the Lower Court relied on them.

On issue 2, it was submitted that the prosecution failed to adduce credible evidence to show that there was a robbery or series of robberies. The Pw1, it was submitted did not identify any of the exhibits as his stolen items. We were referred to Afolalu v. State (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt 1220) 584 at 612 G-H. Also none of the weapons allegedly recovered from the accused persons was tendered at the trial. Worse still, was evidence of Pw2 that Pw1 reported a case of robbery.

It was submitted that the prosecution failed to lead evidence connecting the Appellant to the alleged offence. Exhibits H and H1, it was submitted were not properly evaluated to the extent that the Appellant's right to fair trial has been breached. We were referred to the judgment of the court at pages 246 - 247. It was further submitted that even if exhibits H and H1 were considered, they were not confessional because nowhere in those statements did the Appellant confess to robbing the house of the Pw1 or robbing the Pw1 in person.

It was submitted that the failure of the Pw1 to identify the voice of any of the accused persons who had worked for him before cast doubt on the guilt of the Appellant or any of the other accused persons.

It was submitted that none of the stolen items was found with the Appellant. Most of the stolen items were found with the late Dele Akinbola.

It was submitted that on the available evidence the prosecution failed to prove all the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt.

On issue 1, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that electing to speak in Yoruba language by the Appellant did not mean that the Appellant did not understand English language at all. The court was referred to the record of appeal at page 189 where the Appellant under cross-examination stated thus:

"I am a Senior Secondary School graduate. I left Saint Francis in 2003. I passed WASCE examination"

The Appellant, it was submitted, could not have passed WASCE examination if he did not understand English language. If the Appellant did not understand English language how did he object to the admissibility of the extra judicial statements, asked counsel for the Respondent.

It was submitted that there is a presumption that the Appellant understood the proceedings held in English language. We were referred to Uwachukwu v. The State (2008) 6 ACLR 336 at 354.

It was further submitted that the Appellant was represented by a counsel, Femi Kuteyi Esq. throughout the court proceedings and neither the Appellant nor the counsel representing him complained to the trial court that the appellant did not understand the proceedings. We were referred to Uwachukwu v. State (supra).

The burden, it was submitted was on the Appellant to show that the irregularity complained of in the proceeding led to a failure of justice. The Appellant, it was submitted, failed to show that he was misled in any way which resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

On the argument that the Lower Court ought not to have conducted a trial within trial, it was submitted that the Appellant objected to the statement being admitted in evidence on the ground that it was not voluntarily made. We were referred to page 87 lines 8-13 of the record of appeal and Oguno v. State (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt 1246) 314 at 328.

It was submitted that the trial court did not rely solely on the confessional statement of the Appellant to convict him but also on circumstantial evidence.

On issue 2, it was submitted that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

It was submitted that the confessional statement of the Appellant and those of the other accused persons formed part of the case for the prosecution. It was submitted that the combined and cumulative confessional statements (Exhibits H and H1, M and J and J1) and circumstantial evidence before the trial court laid credence to the fact that the Appellant participated in the armed robbery operation that took place in the house of Pw1 on 6th January, 2005.

It was submitted that the failure of Pw1 to identify Exhibit A will not negate the fact that Pw1 was robbed by armed men on 6th January, 2005. Also that the failure to tender the weapon allegedly used by the armed robbers is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. We were referred to Olayinka v. The State (2008) 6 ACCR 194 at 208.

It was submitted that the argument that the Appellant did not specifically state that he robbed the house of the Pw1 was misplaced because the Appellant referred to a series of operations and the other accused persons made confessional statements. Learned counsel for the Respondent proceeded to show portions of Exhibits M and J which threw light on the confessional statement of the Appellant.

It was finally submitted that the argument that Pw1 ought to have identified the voice of at least one of the robbers who once worked for him is not a requirement of law and that in any case the Pw1 stated that there was no light and that he was confused and terribly afraid.

The law requires that there shall be adequate interpretation to an accused person of anything said in the course of trial or proceedings in a language which he does not understand. Where an accused person is represented by counsel and no objection is raised at the trial court for failure to provide an interpreter, this will not result in vitiating the trial or the judgment of the trial court. It will be a different thing where there is no counsel representing the accused person and where such failure had led to a miscarriage of justice, and prejudiced the accused person as a result. The interpretation is intended to assist the accused person to have knowledge of the case against him and to defend himself, by being able to put before the court his version of the events. See Udosen v. State (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt.1023) 125 and Kamasinki case (1989) EC & HR Judgment, 19 December.

The Appellant in this case was represented from the commencement of the trial on 7th June, 2007 to the date the Lower Court reserved judgment on the 17th February, 2012. There is nothing either in the record of proceedings of the Lower Court or Appellant's brief to suggest that either the Appellant himself or the learned counsel representing him objected to the conduct of the proceedings in the English language. The Appellant has also not shown that he was prejudiced by the failure to interpret the proceedings to him and/or that this led to a miscarriage of justice. Inspite of the fact that the proceedings were in English language, the Appellant nevertheless vigorously defended himself and called his father as a witness. He will therefore not be allowed to flash section 36(6)(e) of the 1999 Constitution FRN on the face of this court.

When the statement of the (1st accused) Appellant was to be tendered in court the following reaction followed:

"Femi Kuteyi Esq.: We are opposing the admissibility of that statement. The statement was not made by the 1st accused person, neither did he sign it as the maker. The statement was not made voluntarily. A gun was pointed at the 1st accused persons (sic). I urge the court to reject the statement."

The above reaction of the learned counsel for the Appellant was a two-in-one complaint. The Appellant in one fell swoop denied making the statements and at the same time alleged that the statements were not voluntarily made. Faced with this type of objection what was the Lower Court expected to do? Whether or not the Appellant made the statements was to be determined later by the court. Whether the statements were not voluntarily made had to be determined instantly in a trial within trial. This the Lower Court did. In my view the Lower Court properly conducted the trial within trial. If it did not that certainly would have been a complaint in this court. The Lower Court therefore successfully avoided the trap by conducting the trial within trial.

From what I have stated above it appears to me that issue 1 should be resolved in favour of the Respondent.

I accordingly resolve the said issue in favour of the Respondent.

To secure a conviction for armed robbery the prosecution must prove the following: (a) that there was an armed robbery; (b) that the accused was armed; and (c) that the accused while with the arm or arms participated in the robbery. Once the prosecution proves the above ingredients beyond reasonable doubt failure to tender the offensive weapon cannot result in the acquittal of the accused person because of the possibility of the accused person doing away with the offensive weapon after the commission of the offence in order to exculpate himself from criminal liability or responsibility. See Olayinka v. State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt.1040) 561 and Okosi v. A.G. Bendel State (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt.100) 642.

Worthy of note is the fact that the alleged armed robbers were masked. Pw1, one of the alleged victims of the armed robbery said that for this reason he did not identify any of the robbers. He did not suspect any particular person either. Pw2 one of the police witnesses said what was reported was a case of robbery. He did not say it was a case of armed robbery that was reported. The alleged armed robbery report was further diluted by the Pw3 another police officer under cross-examination when he stated thus:

"Pw1 came to report a case of stealing at the station."              

By this evidence extracted under cross - examination, the charge for armed robbery was in my view demolished.

Furthermore it is surprising that although the Pw3 said the case reported was that of stealing, he claimed that house breaking instruments were recovered from the house of the Appellant, a toy gun, face mask and knock-outs even though none of these was reported stolen. But the Pw6 said that what was recovered in the house of the Appellant was a mattress, curtain, ring and some valuable items. The Pw3 and Pw6 therefore violently [contradicted themselves as to what was found in the house of the Appellant. What is more none of these things was reported stolen by Pw1.

Pw1 claimed that he found the Appellant at the police station with his wife's jewelry/jewelries. This claim was baseless. Neither Pw3 nor Pw6 said any jewelries were found in the house of the Appellant.

Although the PW3, claimed that house breaking instruments, a toy gun and face masks were found in the house of the Appellant none of these items was tendered by the prosecution. The case of Olayinka v. State (supra) is not applicable here where the alleged weapons were purportedly recovered but none tendered in evidence. Failure to tender any of the purported items recovered was fatal to the case of the Respondent who offered no explanation for the failure to tender any of those items. Moreso that Appellant Pw3 said that what was reported was a case of stealing.

Instead of tendering the items which might have given the incident a semblance of the armed robbery alleged, that is, the house breaking instruments, toy gun, masks and knock outs, the Respondents only tendered a Nokia handset, ear-rings, necklace, chain and wrist chain. None of these items - Exhibits A - G point to the offence of armed robbery.

Inspite of the above, the Lower Court still found the Appellant guilty of armed robbery on the Appellant's confessional statement and on circumstantial evidence.

There is no evidence stronger than a person's own admission or confession. Such a confession is admissible in evidence. Although an accused person can be convicted solely on his own confessional statement, it is desirable to have some evidence outside the confession which would make it probable that the confession was true. See Dibie v. State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt.1038) 30 and Nwaebonyi v. State (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt.343) 130.

Apart from the fact that there was nothing outside the extra-judicial statements linking the Appellant to any offence of robbery the Lower Court appeared not to have perused the extra-judicial statements properly. If it had it would have found that in none of them did the Appellant admit the commission of any robbery for which he was charged, tried and convicted. In the said statements the Appellant referred to a third operation. It is not indicated when and where the operation took place and the type of operation. The sum of N85,000 referred to is not the same with the N50,000 Pw1 alleged was taken by force from his house.

Learned counsel for the Respondents confronted with the inadequacy of Exhibits H and H1 as admission or confession of the alleged offence submitted that the statements of other accused persons shed light on Exhibits H and H1.

With due respect to learned counsel for the Respondent the statements of the other accused persons were not capable of shedding light on Exhibits H and H1 unless the Appellant had been given copies of those statements and he adopted them
. It is the law that a statement of a co-accused is different and distinguishable from his evidence in court. A statement made by an accused person remains his statement and not his evidence and it is binding on him only. Where the prosecution intends to use the statement against the co-accused, a copy of the incriminating statement must be made available to him. See Suberu v. State (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt.1192) 586.

It is clear from the submission of Respondent's counsel that Exhibits H and H1 did not amount to admission or confession of the offence alleged.

The Lower Court was therefore wrong to rely on it to convict the Appellant.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to ground a conviction only where the inferences drawn from the whole history of the case point strongly to the commission of the crime by the accused. The circumstances relied upon should point unequivocally, positively and irresistibly to the fact that the offence was committed and that the accused committed it. Before circumstantial evidence can form the basis for conviction, the circumstances must clearly and forcibly suggest that the accused was the person who committed the offence and that no one else could have been the offender. See Adepetu v. State (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt.568) 185, Yongo v. COP (1992) NWLR (Pt.257) 36, Nwaeze v. State (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt.428) 1, Akinmoju v. State (2000) 4 SC (Pt.1) 64 and Durwode v. State (2000) 12 SC (Pt.1) 1.

At page 247 of the record of appeal the Lower Court made the following finding:

"there is something that strikes my imagination in this case. It is the fact that these three accused persons had at one time or the other, worked for Pw1 in his bakery where the armed robbers came to attack him. The cumulative effect of all these pieces of evidence is what Olorunfemi Esq. relies upon as circumstantial evidence in this case."

Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Appellant and the other accused persons were friends and had worked with the Pw1 at one time or the other. With due respect there was no evidence before the Lower Court that the Appellant and the others were friends. The Lower Court made no such finding. Even if it was established that the Appellant and the other accused persons were friends that would not in the least lead to an inference that they committed the offence for which the Appellant and the others were convicted and sentenced to death.

Although there was evidence that the Appellant and the others at one time or the other worked for the Pw1 who was allegedly robbed it cannot be inferred from this alone that the Appellant and the others committed the offence of armed robbery for which they were tried, convicted and sentenced to death. There was no other circumstantial evidence on the evidence before the Lower Court on which the Appellant could have been convicted.

The Lower Court also wrongly relied on circumstantial evidence to convict the Appellant.

The standard of proof in a criminal trial is proof beyond reasonable doubt. This means that it is not enough for the prosecution to suspect a person of having committed a criminal offence. There must be evidence which identified the person accused with the offence and that it was his act which caused the offence. The burden of proof lies throughout, upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused person and it never shifts. Even where an accused in his statement to the police admitted committing the offence, the prosecution is not relieved of the burden. Failure to discharge this burden renders the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused. See Aigbadion v. State (2000) 4 SC (Pt.1) 1 and Igabele v. State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt 975) 100.

In the instant appeal, the prosecution woefully failed to prove the commission of the offence by the Appellant. The Lower Court relied on the statements made by the Appellant and circumstantial evidence. The statements were not confessional and there was no circumstantial evidence pointing to the guilt of the Appellant.

Issue 2 should therefore be resolved in favour of the Appellant. It is accordingly resolved in his favour.

The said issue having been resolved in favour of the Appellant, the appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the Appellant are hereby quashed.

The Appellant is discharged and acquitted.



MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.:

I read in draft the Judgment Delivered by my learned brother James Shehu Abiriyi, JCA.

I agree with the conclusion and I also abide with the consequential orders.



MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.:

My Lord, Abiriyi, JCA had made available to me before now, a draft copy of the Judgment in this appeal just rendered by him.

From the specific facts and evidence available and relied upon for the conviction and sentence of the Appellant at the trial court, I am in agreement with my learned brother J. S. Abiriyi, JCA that the conviction and sentence were unfounded.

There was no proof of the offence of Armed Robbery against the Appellant herein, as an accused, at the trial court.

In deference to his liberty and presumption of innocence, I concur with my Lord in allowing this appeal and in abiding with the consequential order of discharge and acquittal as entered.